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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
LECTURE SERIES*
THE REFERENDUM: DEMOCRACY'S
BARRIER TO RACIAL EQUALITY
Derrick A. Bell, Jr.**
"Provisionsfor referendums demonstrate devotion to democracy, not
to bias, discrimination,or prejudice."
-Justice Hugo Black***
For most Americans, whether or not legally trained, Justice Black's
statement is unexceptional, accepted as a truism in harmony with the
principles of life in a free society. As proponents of referenda and initiatives never tire of asking, if voters are smart enough to elect representatives to make their laws, are they not just as able to make the
laws themselves? At first glance, this seems logical. But blacks and
other nonwhite groups in this society cannot afford the luxury of reliance on either truisms or the appearance of logic. Their status, success, and sometimes even survival may depend on an instant recognition of the real danger lurking behind what whites might consider
"generally accepted principles." Experience is a far safer guide than
rhetoric; and the experience of blacks with the referendum has proved
ironically that the more direct democracy becomes, the more threatening it is.
The threat is growing. Fueled by frustration with elected representatives whose performances consistently fall far below their expenditures, voters are increasingly turning to "do-it-yourself' government.
In the twenty-three states and hundreds of cities that authorize direct
* The Washington Law Review Lecture Series, now in its fifth year, is designed to
bring outstanding speakers to the law school to discuss contemporary legal issues. The
Review gratefully acknowledges the generous financial assistance provided by the Evans Bunker Memorial Fund.
** Professor of Law, Harvard University; A.B., 1952 Duquesne University; LL.B.,
1957, University of Pittsburgh.
***

Jamesv. Valtierra, 402U.S. 137, 141 (1971).
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legislation, citizens are using referenda to reject existing laws and
initiatives to enact new statutes and ordinances.' The New York
Times reported that "[a] cross the nation, and especially in the West,
in a manner and number not seen before, the ballot is increasingly being used for recalls, initiatives, referendums and constitutional
'
amendments that were once left to local legislatures. Senators James Abourezk, Democrat from South Dakota, and
Mark Hatfield, Republican from Oregon, aware of citizen disenchantment with the unresponsive, often unwieldy, and sometimes corrupt
legislative process, have taken the first steps toward introducing direct
democracy on a national level. In July 1977 they cosponsored a joint
resolution proposing a constitutional amendment to establish a national initiative through which federal laws could be enacted by popular vote.3 Senator Abourezk described the initiative process as
"unique among our democratic rights, [and] founded on the belief
that the citizens of this country are indeed as competent to enact legis4
lation as we are to elect public officials to represent us."
To criticize the trend toward direct democracy appears reactionary, if not un-American. Yet, as suggested earlier, the growing reliance on the referendum and initiative poses a threat to individual
rights in general and in particular creates a crisis for the rights of racial and other discrete minorities. This article seeks to explain why
this is so and how courts might use existing constitutional principles
to recognize legitimate interests in direct legislation, yet protect minority rights against majoritarian abuse.
I.

THE REFERENDUM THREAT DEFINED

When Justice Black hailed referendum provisions as reflecting a
devotion to democracy, and not proof of "bias, discrimination, or prejudice," his was not simply a rhetorical flourish. The statement embo1. Ledbetter, More and More, Voters Write Law, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1977, § 1. at
1, col. 4.
2.

Id.

3. S.J. Res. 67, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 Cong. Rec. S 11,494 (daily ed. July 1I.
1977). Two days of hearings on the resolution were held before the subcommittee on the
Constitution of the Senate's Judiciary Committee on December 13-14, 1977. The Initiative Resolution, which would require a constitutional amendment, is discussed in
more detail at notes 79-84 and accompanying text infra. A similar bill has been introduced in the House by Rep. James R. Jones, Democrat of Oklahoma. HJ. Res. 658,
95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 Cong. Rec. H 12,305 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1977).
4. 123 Cong. Rec. S 11,582 (daily ed. July 11, 1977).

The Referendum
died a central principle of his 1971 majority opinion in James v. Valtierra.5 In that case, black and Mexican-American indigents had
challenged Article 34 of the California constitution, which required
prior approval in a local referendum before a state public body could
develop a federally financed low-rent housing project.6 They argued
that Article 34 unreasonably discriminated, explicitly against the poor
and implicitly against minority groups, because it mandated special
voter approval for low-income housing. A three-judge federal court
held that the provision imposed a special procedural burden on the
legislative capacity to assist minorities, an action previously barred by
the Supreme Court in Hunter v. Erickson.7 Consequently, the lower
court ruled that Article 34 denied the plaintiffs equal protection. 8 On
direct appeal, Professor Archibald Cox, the Jurisprudential Lecturer
of 1976,9 argued to the Supreme Court that the lower court's decision
was correct.
The Supreme Court, however, reversed. Justice Black, writing for a
5-3 majority, distinguished Hunter as involving a referendum that
specifically burdened racial minorities. 10 He perceived little evidence
that the housing referendum required by Article 34 relied on "distinctions based on race."' 1 Noting that mandatory referenda were required by California law for other actions, albeit not connected with
housing,' 2 Justice Black viewed the referendum as a legitimate vehicle
for ensuring "that all the people of a community will have a voice in a
decision which may lead to large expenditures of local governmental
funds for increased public services and to lower tax revenues."' 3 It is
obvious, however, that low-income housing is not the only change in
existing land uses which may adversely affect property owners and
residents or lead to large expenditures of public funds. Real estate
developers need not submit their plans to the populace once they obtain approval under local zoning procedures, and even governmental
5.

402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971).

6.

Id. at 139.

7.

393 U.S. 385 (1969). See note 33 infra for a discussion of Hunter.

8. Valtierra v. Housing Authority, 313 F. Supp. 1,4-6 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
9. Cox, The New Dimensions of Constitutional Adjudication, 51 WASH. L. REV.
791 (1976).
10. 402 U.S. at 140-41.
11. Id. at 141.
12. The three mandatory referenda cited by Justice Black, id.at 142 (constitutional
amendments, certain municipal annexations, and local issuance of general-obligation,
long-term bonds) are unexceptional and clearly distinguishable from Article 34.
13. Id. at 143.
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construction projects, including mental hospitals and prisons, are not
subject to popular veto.
The burden which Article 34 imposed on the poor who rely on
public housing seems clear. Yet the Valtierra majority ignored the de
jure wealth classification created by the referendum requirement, despite the chiding of the dissenters, who, speaking through Justice
Thurgood Marshall, thought it "far too late in the day to contend that
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only racial discrimination." 1 4 In
Justice Marshall's view, the amendment was equally violated by laws
singling out the poor to bear burdens not placed on other classes of
citizens. 15
The Valtierra majority not only refused to subject Article 34 to
"exacting judicial scrutiny" 16 because wealth was not a suspect state
classification but also failed to subject Article 34 to even a token review for a rational relationship between the means employed and the
state purposes purportedly served by the measure. As one commentator noted, "That referenda demonstrate a laudable devotion to principles of popular sovereignty is no justification for mandatory referenda
17
in some instances but not in others."'
Judicial obsequiousness in housing referendum cases where the
result does not overtly and invidiously burden racial minorities is not
justified even when viewed in the light of the erosion of protection of
the poor in more recent Supreme Court decisions.1 8 The poor may be
permitted a measure of bitter confusion over constitutional interpretations that guarantee them entry into the state of California,1 9 even
though their presence will impose "staggering" fiscal and other burdens, 20 yet condone their exclusion from decent housing within the
state if communities, by referendum, refuse to ratify government ap14. Id. at 145.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 144-45. The dissenters urged that the measure was not merely a law of
general application which may affect the poor more harshly but an explicit burden on
one group of citizens based on economic status and that, therefore, the classification was
suspect.
17. The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 126 (1971).
18. See, e.g., Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (state not required to appoint
counsel for discretionary appeals); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974)
(sequestration of goods valid where procedural protections provided), Ortwein v.
Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (filing fees valid for judicial review of administrative reduction in old-age benefits); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (filing fees in
bankruptcy cases not waivable for indigent petitioners).
19. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
20. Id. at 173.

The Referendum
proved and subsidized housing the poor can afford. Perhaps they may
take comfort in the fact that even if frustrated in their efforts to find
low-income housing in suburban areas, where more and more job opportunities are located, they have available the impressive list of protections for indigent criminal defendants. 2 ' In civil actions the poor
are protected by the Constitution from overreaching by creditors using wage garnishments 22 or summary repossession statutes. 23 Access
to the ballot is protected against the barrier of poll taxes, 24 and access
to the courthouse for a divorce may not be barred because of filing
fees. 2 5 But access to affordable housing is not secure. The poor may
be excused if they do not understand an equal protection doctrine that
is consistent only in its ability to divide the Supreme Court and con26
fuse the Court's commentators.
The Valtierra decision was thus not only wrong; it was, in the context of other equal protection decisions affecting the poor and minority groups, also capricious because it eschewed even the most casual
equal protection scrutiny. The decision can be explained only by a
deep-seated faith in the sanctity of referenda results, even when the
action taken seriously disadvantages minorities and the poor. As long
as the disadvantage to minorities is not intentionally racial and arguably furthers a reasonable interest, judicial intervention is not forthcoming.
Justice Black's assertion that referenda demonstrate devotion to democracy was not completely unexpected. His commitment to the
referendum had been amply demonstrated in earlier decisions 27 and
he has since bequeathed his faith to a solid majority of the Court,

21.

See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (imprisonment cannot ex-

ceed statutory maximum for inability to pay fine); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967) (diligent representation by court-appointed counsel); Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963) (counsel on appeal); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 344 (1963) (right

to counsel in criminal cases); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (free transcript on
appeal). Indigents were seen as the primary beneficiaries of the right-to-counsel cases,
as made clear in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 472 (1966). See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-38 to 16-40 (1978).
22. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).

23.

Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).

24. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
25. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
26. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreiword: Equal Citizenship Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1977).
27. Justice Black dissented in both Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), and
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). See notes 32 & 33 infra.
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whose devotion to the referendum presents a serious danger to the
civil rights of minority groups.
Chief Justice Burger relied heavily on Justice Black's Valtierra
opinion in City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises,Inc.2 8 That decision upheld a charter provision of the suburban town of Eastlake,
Ohio, which required approval of all zoning changes by a fifty-five
percent referendum vote. The Ohio Supreme Court had found that
the requirement frustrated a multifamily, high rise apartment project,
in violation of the owner-developer's due process rights.2 9 Calling the
referendum process "a basic instrument of democratic government," 30
Chief Justice Burger adopted Justice Black's view that "[t] his procedure ensures that all the people of a community will have a voice in a
decision which may lead to large expenditures of local governmental
'3 1
funds for increased public services."
28. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
29. 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 324 N.E.2d 740(1975).
30. City of Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 679.
31. Id. at 678-79 (emphasis by Burger, C.J.). The majority distinguished two earlier
Supreme Court zoning decisions finding due process defects in delegations of legislative
power to narrow segments of the community. Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co.
v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928) (striking down an ordinance requiring the written consent of two-thirds of the property owners within 400 feet of the proposed site of a home
for the aged in a residential area); Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912)
(striking down city ordinance granting power to establish building setback lines to the
owners of two-thirds of the property abutting any street). Chief Justice Burger stated
that "the standardless delegation of power to a limited group of property owners condemned ... in Eubank and Roberge [was] not to be equated with decision-making by
the people through the referendum process." If the results of such referendum action
were deemed unreasonable or arbitrary, the property owner could challenge it in the
state courts. 426 U.S. at 677-79.
In a brief dissent, Justice Powell approved the general use of referenda for zoning decisions but said that its use to determine the status of a single parcel of land provided no
real chance for the owner to be heard. He feared the single-parcel referendum would
"open disquieting opportunities for local government bodies to bypass normal protective procedures for resolving issues affecting individual rights." Id. at 680.
Justice Stevens also dissented. He deemed the challenged referendum process "manifestly unreasonable" and a denial of "fundamental fairness." Id. at 694. Quoting from a
concurring opinion in the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in the case, Justice Stevens
agreed that "[t] here can be little doubt of the true purpose of Eastlake's charter provision-it is to obstruct change inland use, by rendering such change so burdensome as to
be prohibitive." Id. at 689.
The Valtierra and City of Eastlake decisions have been criticized by zoning and planning experts who believe the voter referendum requirements in both cases, like that in
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), "were not imposed out of devotion to abstract
principles of direct democracy. They were imposed to raise difficult, and frequently insuperable, barriers to the provision of needed lower income housing or to any change in
the municipality's existing land-use regulations." ABA ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
HOUSING AND URBAN GROWTH, HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER LAW 93 (R. Fishman, ed.
1978). See also Wolfstone, The Case for a Procedural Due Process Limitation on the
Zoning Referendum: City of Eastlake Revisited, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 51 (1978).

The Referendum
Thus, in both Valtierraand City of Eastlake, the seemingly neutral,
proper encouragement of direct community control implemented
through a popular referendum established direct democracy as a constitutionally sanctioned vehicle for excluding the poor and, therefore,
minorities. The impressive protection provided a few short years before in Reitman v. Mulkey3 2 and Hunter v. Erickson33 has been circumvented.
Justice Black, in a lone dissent to Hunter, had expressed regret that
in a government "of the people, by the people, and for the people" a
city could not constitutionally condition the enactment of a law on
popular approval. 34 The language was excessive, but Justice Black
had a point. Both Reitman and Hunter, to an extent not acknowledged fully by the majority opinions of Justice White, involved the
difficult task of balancing the statutory rights of minorities against the
majority's desire to implement its will.
Justice Harlan, concurring in Hunter, indicated that local communities could exercise what he considered to be their democratic right
to repeal antidiscrimination laws by passing a referendum which was
"grounded in neutral principles," even though it "might occasionally
operate to disadvantage Negro political interests." 35 To underscore
this lesson, the Court shortly thereafter denied review of a Toledo,
32. 387 U.S. 369 (1967). In the famous Proposition 14 referendum, California voters repealed the state's fair housing laws with a constitutional amendment that barred
any restriction on a property owner's discretion to sell or lease to any person "in his absolute discretion." The Supreme Court found the amendment was more than a mere repeal of the fair housing laws. It had involved the state in "authorizing" and "encouraging" illegal racial discrimination in violation of the equal protection clause. Id. at 37576.
33. 393 U.S. 385 (1969). The Supreme Court struck down an Akron, Ohio, charter
amendment that had been proposed and quickly ratified in the wake of the city council's
passage of a fair housing ordinance. The amendment required approval of any fair
housing legislation "by a majority of the electors voting on the question at a regular or
general election." Id. at 387. The Court found the law "drew a distinction between those
groups who sought the law's protection against racial, religious, or ancestral discriminations in the sale and rental of real estate and those who sought to regulate real property
transactions in the pursuit of other ends." Id. at 390. The former were subject to more
complex procedures of lawmaking than were the latter and thus were denied equal protection. Id. at 390-93. In effect, the provision made it virtually impossible for certain
minorities to secure protective housing legislation.
34. 393 U.S. at 397.
35. Id. at 393-95. Again, the nation's impoverished blacks may require instruction
in the niceties of constitutional law. Otherwise, they might conclude that Justice Harlan
added insult to injury when he first spelled out a means of perpetuating discriminatory
housing practices by enshrouding repeal of a fair housing ordinance in a mantle of neutrality, and then denigrated the hard-won-and now lost-protection by characterizing
it as merely a "Negro political interest."
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Ohio, city charter provision which had been used to repeal a recently
enacted fair housing ordinance. 36 That charter provision enabled vot-

ers by referendum to legislate for themselves or to pass on legislation
enacted by any governmental body and provided that the action taken

would not be subject to amendment or repeal without a general vote
of the people. The effect of the referendum was to remove the question of fair housing practices from the city council's jurisdiction and
to place it in the hands of the electorate. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the procedure, finding no substantial constitutional question. 37
Thus, Justice Harlan's advice has been heeded. Referendum
provisions simply repealing fair housing ordinances or laws and upsetting city council or zoning commission approval to build low-income
housing have become a standard means of barring minorities from
suburban, residential communities. 38 The Supreme Court's approval
36. Holland v. Lucas County Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 1080 (1969) (petition for
writ of certiorari denied).
37. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at la-23a. Holland v. Lucas County Bd. of
Elections, 393 U.S. 1080 (1969) (reprinting the decisions of the Ohio courts and the text
of the local provisions involved).
38. See, e.g., Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. City of Union
City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970). Declining to consider the issue of racial motivation
in a city-wide vote that nullified city council approval of a low-income housing project.
the court rejected arguments that the referendum subjected zoning decisions to voter
bias, caprice, and self-interest. Id. at 294-95. "A referendum.., is far more than an expression of ambiguously founded neighborhood preference. It is the city itself legislating
through its voters-an exercise by the voters of their traditional right through direct legislation to override the views of their elected representatives as to what serves the public
interest." Id. at 294. The Union City court relied on the Fourth Circuit's refusal to enjoin a referendum repealing a recently enacted fair housing statute in Maryland.
Spaulding v. Blair, 403 F.2d 862 (1968). See also Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 417 F.2d
321 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 980 (1970); Yarborough v. City of Warren,
383 F. Supp. 676 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
A few federal district courts followed Reitman and enjoined referenda which
repealed fair housing ordinances. See, e.g., Holmes v. Leadbetter, 294 F. Supp. 991
(E.D. Mich. 1968); Otey v. Common Council, 281 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
State courts, in zoning cases, have often enjoined referenda seeking to overturn decisions by zoning or planning commissions in order to further uniformity of standards
and protect the integrity of master plans prepared by experts. See, e.g., City of Scottsdale v. Superior Court, 103 Ariz. 204, 439 P.2d 290 (1968); West v. City of Portage,
392 Mich. 458, 221 N.W.2d 303 (1974): Kelley v. John, 162 Neb. 319, 75 N.W.2d 713
(1956); Township of Sparta v. Spillane, 125 N.J. Super. 519, 312 A.2d 154 (1973).
Leonard v. City of Bothell, 87 Wn. 2d 847, 557 P.2d 1306 (1976). One ground of decision in these cases is that the zoning activities of municipal bodies, especially amendments to a zoning plan, are not legislative actions but administrative, and therefore not
subject to referendum or initiative. See, e.g., West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458,
221 N.W.2d 303, 305-06 (1974); Leonard v. City of Bothell, 87 Wn. 2d 847, 850-51,
557 P.2d 1306, 1308-09 (1976). The basis for judicial concern when communities turn
to direct legislation in zoning matters is reviewed in two recent student pieces. Note,
Zoning and the Referendum: Converging Powers, Conflicting Processes, N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 97, 113- 14 (1977); Note, The Proper Use of Referenda in Rezoning,
29 STAN. L. REV. 819(1977).

The Referendum
of the referendum technique in Valtierra and City of Eastlake illustrates that in the post-civil rights era overt discrimination is rendered
unnecessary by the adoption of standards facially neutral as to race
and arguably legitimate in purpose, but which even the most unsophisticated voters recognize as effective in excluding poor and
nonwhite groups.
Despite the broad reading given Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
196439 and the impressive efforts of legal scholars, 40 the Supreme
Court, in reviewing equal protection challenges, has refused to disfavor laws and policies that are not overtly discriminatory even though
those laws and policies disproportionately disadvantage the members
of racial minorities. 4 1 The question then is whether, in the practice of
popular sovereignty, there are unacknowledged aspects of racial discrimination or some other basis, such as a serious danger to our legislative form of government, which entitle minority groups to special
protection when their interests are disadvantaged by repeal of protective legislation through the use of initiative or referendum. In Parts II
and III, I shall suggest reasons for answering both portions of this
question in the affirmative.
II.

POPULAR DEMOCRACY AND THE SOCIAL-CLASS
ORIGINS OF RACIAL CONFLICT

Racial equality in this society is a goal long sought but still not
achieved. More than a century after the Emancipation Proclamation,
equality remains so fragile a value that those who would preserve it
must be alert to every nuance of societal behavior that could pose a
threat. Thus, social attitudes toward racial equality are an appropriate
39. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
40. See, e.g., Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreiward:In Defense ofthe
Antidiscrimination Principle,90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976); Perry, The Disproportionate
Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination,125 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1977).
41. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The Washington v. Davis
principle has been applied in recent cases in several areas. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of

Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977) (school desegregation); Castaneda v. Partida,
430 U.S. 482 (1977) (jury discrimination); Austin Independent School Dist. v. United
States, 429 U. S. 990 (1976) (school desegregation); Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (5th
Cir. 1978) (voting). See generally Schwemm, From Washington to Arlington Heights

and Beyond: DiscriminatoryPurpose in Equal Protection Litigation, 1977 U. ILL. L.

FoR. 961, 1051 (concluding that discriminatory purpose will be very difficult to prove
in all but the most egregious cases).
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litmus to measure the danger to blacks and other minorities which
may result if those urging greater reliance on the referendum prevail.
Racism is not simply a disease that afflicts some whites and leaves
the rest untouched. It is a pervasive influence, though it manifests itself most virulently among those lower-class whites who have been
and remain convinced that their own insecure social status may best
be protected by opposing equal rights for blacks. This view is contagious and perhaps incurable. It results in white support for policies
limiting the rights of blacks even while simultaneously, if more subtly,
those policies also limit opportunities for less advantaged whites.
This, at least, has been the historic pattern. In seventeenth-century
Virginia small farmers, chafing at the high rents charged by the major
landowners and the low rates paid for their crops, threatened rebellion. The large planters, who controlled the legislature, ended the
threat by easing voting restrictions so that the lower-class whites could
participate in, but not control, the election process. The wealthy landowners then extended the indentured servitude of blacks to life terms
and enacted laws giving all whites dominion over all blacks. This action both ensured a stable and controllable work force for those
whites who could afford large holdings of slaves and rendered effective competition by small farmers impossible. The strategy worked because white farmers became more concerned with identifying with the
large planters on the basis of race than in continuing their rebellion
42
against economic exploitation by the upper class.
As the United States evolved from an agrarian to an industrial society, racism continued to distort economic class alignments. Consider,
for example, the additional difficulties the labor movement accepted
during its nineteenth-century organizing efforts because of its refusal
to unionize nonwhite workers. Excluded from the normal work force
even in trades which they once dominated, black workers were forced
to take those jobs whites would not accept and, during strikes, those
jobs which whites had vacated. In both instances the presence of an
unorganized black work force served to depress the wages of white
workers and reduce the unions' leverage in negotiations with management.43 Preserving white superiority rather than mounting a unified
42. See generally E. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE
ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA ch. 15-17 (1975).
See I H. HILL, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: RACE, WORK.
43.
AND THE LAW 14-21 (1977).

The Referendum
attack against shared economic disadvantages meant that poorer
whites maintained their dominance over blacks, but meant also that
upper-class whites maintained their control and exploitation of both
blacks and poor whites.
Little has changed. Today, for example, labor unions are usually

the major defendants in employment discrimination litigation. They
argue, without apparent shame, that testing procedures and seniority
rules should be retained despite the fact that these rules perpetuate the

overtly racist employment practices demanded by an earlier generation of union leaders and the workers they represented. 44
School desegregation battles are waged at the street level between
lower-class whites and poor blacks competing for admission to
schools whose resources are inadequate to educate either group effectively.4 5 At the college and professional school levels, upwardly mobile whites like Marco DeFunis46 and Allan Bakke 47 and their hosts
of lower and middle-class supporters focus their legal and political attacks on the miniscule ten percent minority admissions programs
carved out after much effort and sacrifice by blacks, ignoring the obvious fact that traditional admissions criteria favoring family and
class contacts effectively provide upper-class, mainly white, applicants with preferential access to ninety percent of the available positions.
Thus, the great tragedy of Bakke-type litigation for both blacks and
poorer whites is that both disadvantaged groups are competing for a

44. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977);
EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct.
3145 (1978); United States v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 460 F.2d 497 (4th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1007 (1972); Local 189, United Papermakers and Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919
(1970). See generally W. GOULD, BLACK WORKERS IN WHITE UNIONS (1977).
45. The Boston school desegregation litigation is a classic illustration. Morgan v.
Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974), affd sub nom. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509
F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975). See Bell, The Burden of
Brown on Blacks: History-Based Observations on a Landmark Decision, 7 N. CAR.
CENT. L. REV. 25, 30-32 (1975).
Of course, where the interests of middle and upper-class whites appear to them threatened by school desegregation, they vote for referenda issues intended to frustrate or delay desegregation in percentages quite close to those of lower-class whites. Vander Zanden, Voting on SegregationistReferenda, 25 PUB. OP. Q. 92 (1961).
46. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wn. 2d 11, 507, P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated as moot
and remanded, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), no action taken on remand, 84 Wn. 2d 617, 529
P.2d 438 (1974).
47. Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 553
P.2d 1152 (1976), affd in part and rev'd in part,98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
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clearly inadequate share of the educational pie. There is no satisfactory legal solution to the problem of special admissions programs as
presently constituted. Had the Supreme Court declared all minority
admissions programs invalid, the decision could well have been a signal to many agencies and institutions to roll back much of the progress blacks have made during the past twenty-five years. On the other
hand, had the racial quotas and separate admissions standards
adopted in the absence of proven discrimination won Court approval,
the decision would have legitimated the existing admissions arrangements by which minorities are relegated to an inadequate share of the
places in our colleges and professional schools, while all but the most
extraordinarily able poorer whites would be entirely excluded.
History as well as contemporary experience teaches that less advantaged whites, bitter at this outcome, would likely direct their anger at
the blacks with whom they see themselves competing, rather than at
those upper-class whites whose policies in admissions, as in employment, render white competition with blacks so virulent and hopeless.
The success of this racially oriented policy-making is made
possible, at least in part, because in America race is more important
than class. Marxian analysis notwithstanding, the stratifying role of
race prevents many working-class Americans from perceiving much
difference in, or manifesting any concern about, the built-in advantages of wealth and class position. 48 The economist Robert
Heilbroner has suggested that, despite our wealth, we lag behind
countries like Norway, Sweden, Denmark, England, and even Cuba
and China in addressing basic problems of poverty, slum housing,
public health, and prison reform, because in those countries, "there is
no parallel to the corrosive and pervasive role played by race in the
problem of social neglect in the United States." 4 9 According to Dr.
Heilbroner, Americans refuse to support social reforms because they
48. Justice Blackmun commented on the phenomenon in his Bakke opinion:
It is somewhat ironic to have us so deeply disturbed over a program where race is
an element of consciousness, and yet to be aware of the fact, as we are, that institutions of higher learning, albeit more on the undergraduate than the graduate level,
have given conceded preferences up to a point to those possessed of athletic skills.
to the children of alumni, to the affluent who may bestow their largess on the institutions, and to those having connections with celebrities, the famous, and the powerful.
98 S. Ct. at 2807.
49. Heilbroner, The Roots of Social Neglect in the United States, in Is LAw DEAD?
288, 296 (E. Rostow ed. 1971).
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sense such reforms would mainly aid undeserving blacks. Although
statistics reveal the error in such thinking, "the fear and resentment of
the Negro takes precedence over the social problem itself. The result,
unfortunately, is that the entire society suffers from the results of a
failure to correct social evils whose ill effects refuse to obey the rules
50
of segregation."
The high priority many whites give to maintaining racial superiority will undoubtedly be expressed at the ballot box. Throughout this
country's history, politicians have succumbed to the temptation to
wage a campaign appealing to the desire of whites to dominate
blacks. More recently, however, the growing black vote has begun to
have an impact and even effected "Road to Damascus" conversions
on more than a few political Pauls, some of whom even claim "born
again" experiences during mid-term. 51 This impact may be subverted
if voting majorities may enact controversial legislation directly.
III.

A SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSESSMENT OF PLEBISCITE
PROCESSES

Public officials, even those elected on more or less overtly racist
campaigns, may prove responsive to minority pressures for civil rights
measures once in office or, at least, be open to the negotiation and
give-and-take that constitutes much of the political process. Thus, legislators may vote for, or executive officials may sign, a civil rights or
social reform bill with full knowledge that a majority of their constituents oppose the measure. 52 They are in the spotlight and do not
50.
51.

Id.
Mississippi Senator James Eastland, a modern archetype of the post-Populist

Southern politician, and long a leader in opposing civil rights legislation, indicated his
desire for black voting support as he faced a challenge from a more liberal candidate.
Subsequently, Senator Eastland decided not to seek re-election to the seat he has held

for 36 years. N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1978, § A, at 18, col. 1.
52. The dilemma for public officials is not recent. Racial prejudice in the North, especially virulent prior to the Civil War, did not cease when the Union victory resulted in
the abolition of slavery. Between 1865 and 1870 proposals for Negro voting were defeated in at least 14 Northern states. See Dykstra & Hahn, Northern Voters and Negro
Suffrage: The Case ofloiva, 1868, 32 PUB. OP. Q. 202 (1968). The authors advise:
Rejection of Negro suffrage by Northern states in the Reconstruction era placed
the Republican "radicals" in Congress in a serious dilemma. At the same time that

most of them demanded the right to vote for Southern Negroes, some on the
grounds of principle, others to establish a Republican foothold in the South, their
constituents blocked similar plans in the North.
Id. at 203.
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wish publicly to advocate racism; they cannot openly attribute their
opposition to "racist constituents." The more neutral reasons for opposition are often inadequate in the face of serious racial injustices,
particularly those posing threats not confined to the minority commu53
nity.
When the legislative process is turned back to the citizenry either to
enact laws by initiative or to review existing laws through the referendum, few of the concerns that can transform the "conservative" politician into a "moderate" public official are likely to affect the
individual voter's decision. No political factors counsel restraint on
racial passions emanating from longheld and little considered beliefs
and fears. Far from being the pure path to democracy that Justice
Black proclaimed, direct democracy, carried out in the privacy of the
voting booth, has diminished the ability of minority groups to participate in the democratic process. Ironically, because it enables the voters' racial beliefs and fears to be recorded and tabulated in their pure
53. See Wolfinger & Greenstein. 7lie Repeal of Fair Housing in California: An
Analysis of Referendum Voting, 62 Ai. PoL. Sci. REV. 753. 768-69 (1968). Reviewing
Proposition 14, the authors express doubt that the state's fair housing law (the Rumford
Act) would have passed in the first place if the politicians had fully known how unpopular it was. But they report that civil rights interests had pushed hard for the bill and some
activists had chained themselves to the state capitol for a four-week sit-in that ended
only when the act passed. In assessing these developments, the authors note that the legislative decision-making process is characterized by compromises between the initial
demands of groups of varying size and intensity. They continue as follows:
In referenda, of course, compromise is impossible once the issue has been formally posed. A second, closely related advantage of legislatures is that they
typically take account of the intensity of demands as well as their numerical support, while in referenda every voter's preference, no matter how casual, is equally
weighted. The legislative process is responsive to intensity because legislators (consciously or unconsciously) ask themselves how much the interested parties care
about the issue since they want to find out what the cost in votes and other forms of
campaign support will be of disappointing one side or the other.
Calculations about intensity are relevant to considerations other than electoral
advantage. First, a politician may feel on principle that, all things being equal. he
would rather respond to an intense minority than a more or less lukewarm majority particularly if he thinks the minority's claim is legitimate. It appears that Governor Brown's strong support of the Rumford Act was based on such a view, along
with a belief that fair housing was essential to any strategy of coping with the Negro
problem. Second, as the history of California race relations since Watts reminds us,
judgments about intensity are crucial data for the enterprise of making policies designed to minimize civil strife. A key consideration in assessing civil rights
proposals is whether their passage or failure will increase or reduce the likelihood
of racial disturbance.
Id.
For other studies reaching generally similar conclusions, see Clubb & Traugott, National Patterns in Referenda Voting: The 1968 Election, in 6 URBAN AFFAIRS ANNUAL
REVIEW, PEOPLE AND POLITICS IN URBAN SOCIETY 137 (H. Hahn ed. 1972); Kendall &

Carey, The Intensity Problem and Democratic Theory, 62 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 5 (1968).
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form, the referendum has been a most effective facilitator of that bias,
discrimination, and prejudice which has marred American democracy
54
from its earliest day.
A.

Historical Considerations

Courts have been reluctant to grapple with or even acknowledge
the plethora of racist influences and status and class concerns which
come into play when the future of a fair housing law is to be decided
at the voting booth, or when the electorate must approve, perhaps as
in City of Eastlake by some super-majority, a legislative or administrative decision to construct a low-income housing project. Any serious consideration of the degree to which prejudice affects the outcome of race-related referenda must at the very least bring an end to
the uncritical acceptance and repetition of the unproved assumptions
that direct voting techniques are fair and faithful reflections of the
country's highest democratic values.
Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion in City of Eastlake, for example, relied too heavily on the fiction that the referendum process is
the exercise of a nondelegated legislative power which, for some
unexplained reason, gains legitimacy and need not even be scrutinized
to insure regularity, merely because it is exercised directly by the people.5 5 For support, the Chief Justice turned to history, comparing the
referendum with the New England town meeting, which he deemed
'5 6
"both a practical and symbolic part of our democratic processes.
But, as several historians have pointed out, the colonial town meeting's effectiveness was due largely to the cultural and political homo-

54.

Between 1963 and 1968, 10 cities and the state of California conducted open

housing referenda. All were initiated by opponents of fair housing measures who were
successful in every case until 1968, when the Flint, Michigan, ordinance was upheld by
a paper-thin margin on recount. Hamilton, Direct Legislation: Some Implications of
Open Housing Referenda, 64 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 124, 125 (1970).
Another critical analysis of the referendum found:

Not only does the referendum hold great potential for racial divisiveness and for
worsening inter-group relations, but it can also be employed by relatively small,
organized groups to prevent achievement of the legitimate hopes and aspirations of

underprivileged minorities.
Scott & Nathan, Public Referenda: A Critical Reappraisal,5 URB. AFF. Q. 313, 319

(1970).
55. 426 U.S. at 672. See Note, Zoning and the Referendum: Converging Powers,
Conflicting Processes, 6 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 97, 106-07, 122-23 (1977).

56. 426U.S. at 673.
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geneity of its participants. 57 The town meeting was less a forum for
conflicting opinions than a place for ratifying, usually by
unanimous vote, prior understandings of the community. The meeting
expressed the will of a homogenous electorate shaped by exclusionary
controls on the admission of new residents. 58 Such exclusionary controls were as tight as those now achieved by zoning referenda in modern suburbs.
Subtle social pressures in those small communities tended to minimize dissent, and even though the communities were small, they often
lacked adequate information. James Madison, who preferred
representative government because it fostered consideration and compromise of competing interests, believed that popular democracy was
prone to majority dictatorship because there were few checks on the
temptation to sacrifice minority interests or disadvantage unpopular
individuals.

59

Madison's eighteenth-century fears became nineteenth-century reality when, for example, voters in the Oregon territory overwhelmingly approved an 1857 referendum law intended to exclude all free
blacks. 60 Despite its very small black population, residents of the territory had discussed barring blacks for several years, but neither the
57.

E.g., Zuckerman, The Social Context of Democracy in Massachusetts, 25 WN.

& MARY Q. (3d Ser.) 523. 538-40 (1968). See also Note, supra note 55, at 106-07.
Moreover, the New England town meetings were relatively small groups, thus making
debate feasible.
58. Zuckerman. supra note 57, at 538-40.
59. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison) at 133 (B. Wright ed. 1961). Madison frequently expressed his preference for a "republic" which he defined as "a government in
which the scheme of representation takes place," over a "pure democracy." He discussed
the dangers of pure democracy as follows:
[A] society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer
the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the
whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government itself:
and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an
obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies ... have ever been found
incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general
been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they
would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.
Id. See also Reitman, 387 U.S. at 387 (1967) (Douglas, J. concurring) (quoting 5 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 272 (Hunt ed. 1904)); THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison) at

356 (B. Wright ed. 1961).
60. E. BERWANGER, THE

FRONTIER AGAINST SLAVERY: WESTERN ANTI-NEGRO PREJUDICE AND THE SLAVERY EXTENSION CONTROVERSY 85-93 (1967).
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legislature nor constitutional conventions would approve such a
measure because each political party feared that another would be
able to exploit the issue.6 ' When the proposal was finally submitted to
a popular vote, however, it received more support than an accompanying antislavery proposition. 62 Voting on both issues reflected the
whites' belief that they should not have to compete with slaves or free
blacks for jobs, that blacks would bring crime and disease, and that
Oregon should be preserved for the white race. 63 The same motivation prompted the citizens of Kansas to adopt a similar restriction
against blacks in 1855.64 Even earlier, Indiana and Illinois had voted
by large majorities to include anti-black immigration provisions in
their constitutions. 65 Although anti-black immigration laws were seldom enforced, historian Leon Litwack regards them both as a constant reminder to Negroes of their inferior position in society and as a
convenient excuse for whites to engage in mob violence and frequent
66
harassment of the black population.
No court seems to have considered the potential of present-day barriers against low-income housing to convey the same message or
similarly to encourage harassment of those minority families who
manage to move into such areas. Certainly, the Court majorities in
Valtierra and City of Eastlake failed to grasp the point, although Justice Stevens, dissenting in the Eastlake case, recognized the exclusion67
ary impact of the referendum requirement.
StructuralConsiderations

B.

A realistic assessment of referenda and initiatives must include an
examination of how they have developed in practice as well as a description of their theoretical democratic virtues. Direct legislation, the
creation of progressives of another era, today poses more danger to
social progress than the problems of governmental unresponsiveness it
61. Id.
62. The exclusion of free blacks was approved by an 8,640 to 1,081 vote. The antislavery provision was favored by 7,727 to 2,645. Id. at 93. The Oregon statehood bill
was passed including both provisions. Id. at 95.
63. Id. at 93-94.
64. Id. at I1-12.

65.

L.

LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES,

1790-1860,

69-72 (1961). Under strong pressure from their constituencies, several state legislatures

had enacted similar provisions. Id. at 70 nn.12 & 13.
66. Id. at 72.
67. 426 U.S. at 689 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
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was intended to cure. This is not to suggest that we ought to ignore
the defects and disappointments of the representative system which
today, as in the past, have spurred public recourse to direct legislation. All too often, both Congress and the President become targets
and, one fears, the captives of powerful business interests. 6 8 It is also
undeniable that representatives may vote on bills which they do not
understand or concerning which they have been improperly influenced.
Nevertheless, our distrust and dissatisfaction with the Congress,
with state and local representatives, and with executive officials
should not so quickly lead us to conclude that increased reliance on
direct democracy will avoid those evils to which legislatures and Congress seem so vulnerable. Supporters of minority rights must be concerned that both the initiative and the referendum often serve those
opposed to reform. It is clear, for example, that direct legislation is
used effectively by residents of homogenous middle-class communities
to prevent unwanted development-especially development that
portends increased size or heterogeneity of population. 69
Today, direct democracy is used comparatively infrequently to
curb abuses in government or otherwise to control elected officials.
Rather, intense interest is generated when the issues are seemingly
clear-cut and often emotional matters such as liquor, gun control, pollution, pornography, or race. Complicated taxation problems and
matters of governmental structure, on the other hand, typically evoke
70
little voter response.
The emotionally charged atmosphere often surrounding referenda
and initiatives can easily reduce the care with which the voters consider the matters submitted to them. Tumultuous, media-oriented
campaigns, such as the ones successfully used to repeal ordinances
recognizing the rights of homosexuals in Dade County, Florida, St.
Paul, Minnesota, and Eugene, Oregon, are not conducive to careful
thinking and voting. 7 1 A similar furor surrounded the innovative
68.
See generally T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969).
69. Glenn, State Law Limitations on the Use of Initiatives and Referenda in Connection with Zoning Amendnents, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 265, 267 n. 10 (1978).

70. A study of initiative use in Washington State indicated that in the 60 years from
1914 to 1973, public morals were the most likely subject for direct legislative proposals.
followed by revenue and tax measures and, finally, government reforms. Bone & Benedict, Perspectives on Direct Legislation: Washington State's Experience 1914-1973.

28 W. POL. Q. 330, 332-34, 347 (1975).
71.

Lichtenstein, Laws Aiding Homosexuals Face Rising Opposition Around Na-
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"anti-pornography" law enacted by initiative in the State of Washington but promptly declared unconstitutional in Spokane Arcades, Inc.
72
v. Ray.
Appeals to prejudice, oversimplification of the issues, and exploitation of legitimate concerns by promising simplistic solutions to complex problems often characterize referendum and initiative campaigns.7 3 Of course, politicians, too, may offer quick cure-alls to gain
tion, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1978, § 1, at 1, col. 3. At this point, debate is better avoided
as to whether civil rights statutes intended to protect blacks from discrimination in
schools, employment, and public facilities would be more respected if faced with repeal
in referenda, than were first amendment rights of pornographic store owners or civil
rights protections for homosexuals. It may be significant, though, that the Dade County
and St. Paul voters amended their civil rights ordinances by simply deleting "affectional
or sexual preference" language from the provisions prohibiting discrimination "based
on race, creed, sex, color, national origin or ancestry." Ballot Question, Dade County,
Fla. (June 7, 1977) (repealed Dade County Ordinance No.77-4 which had added "affectional or sexual preference" language to section I 1A of the Dade County Code) (on
file with Washington Law Review); Initiative to Amend Chapter 74 of the St. Paul Legislative Code, City of St. Paul, Minn. (April 25, 1978) (struck similar language which
had been added to Chapter 74 by Ordinance No. 15153) (on file with Washington Law
Review). The Dade County vote in favor of repeal was 208,504 to 92,212. Certificate of
County Commissioners, Dade County, Fla. (June 8, 1977) (on file with Washington
Law Review). The St. Paul vote was 54,101 to 31,689. City of St. Paul. Minn., Council
Resolution, Ordinance No. 16436 (April 28, 1978) (on file with Washington Law Review). A measure of the issue's emotional component can be gained by a reading of the
two ordinances, neither of which contains enforcement authority or penalties for civil
rights violators.
72. 449 F. Supp. 1145 (E.D. Wash. 1978). Even tax initiatives may carry other
overtones. The success of California's initiative limiting property taxes, Proposition 13,
can be seen as a response not only to high tax rates but also to the belief of many voters
that approval would result in reduction of funds paid to unwed mothers and other welfare recipients.
73. This fate, as Ralph Nader has suggested, often dooms liberal measures intended
to enact apparently popular reforms, which, because of industry lobbying, cannot be enacted by legislatures. Nader, Direct Democracy via Referenda, Washington Star, Nov.
6, 1976, § C, at 2, col. 1. In Massachusetts, initiatives designed to equalize electric rate
structures for large and small users, to prohibit possession or sale of handguns, and to
ban no-return beverage containers were placed on the November 1976 ballot. All went
down to defeat, the first two by enormous margins, literally buried in an avalanche of
industry-sponsored ads suggesting that enactment of the measures would result in the
loss of jobs, manhood, and the opportunity to grab gusto. Even where industry interests
do not influence the outcome with well-financed media campaigns, voters often refuse
to approve measures clearly in their own interest. In Massachusetts, efforts to win approval for a graduated state income tax are defeated year after year with low income
voters often more opposed than those in the upper income brackets. As one cab driver
explained his opposition to me, "I don't trust them. If we give them a chance to change
the tax laws around, we will end up on the short end."
In testifying before the Senate Subcommittee considering Senate Joint Resolution 67,
the proposed constitutional amendment for the National Voter Initiative, Professor Peter Bachrach opposed the measure in terms that define the attitude of poor voters like
the just-quoted cab driver:
We have case after case within the municipalities where the initiative and referendum has been used where voters who stood to gain from a vote on a bond would
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electoral support and may spend millions on election campaigns that
are as likely to obfuscate as to elucidate the issues. But we vote
politicians into office, not into law. Once in office, they may become
well-informed, responsible representatives; at the least, their excesses
may be curtailed by the checks and balances of the political process.
The success or failure of ballot-box legislation, therefore, may depend less on the merits of the issue than on who is financing the campaign. One California public relations official boasted that he could
put any issue on the California state ballot for $325,000. 74 Even before the Supreme Court's rejection of spending regulations in First
National Bank of Boston v. Belloti,75 large corporations were invest-

ing huge sums in referenda campaigns. 76 With so much at stake it is
not surprising to find direct voting procedures criticized for phrasing
proposals deceptively, for abusing the signature gathering process, especially by professional signature gathering organizations, and for political sloganeering intended to obscure and confuse public
77
discussion.
The Court's failure to review more closely the many opportunities
for misrepresentation, financial abuse, and outright fraud can only
encourage campaigners to appeal to prejudice. The record of recent
ballot legislation reflects all too accurately the conservative, even intolerant, attitudes citizens display when given the chance to vote their
fears and prejudices, especially when exposed to expensive media
vote against it because of their feeling of powerlessness and their feeling of being
ripped off by the government. They cannot understand that this bond issue might
actually be used for their benefit. They are that much turned off that it makes them
quite irrational.
Hearingson S.J. Res. 67 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Conm.
on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 61 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. To illustrate his point, Professor Bachrach reported that in a recent referendum in Maine, the
voters nullified a court order requiring the state to distribute school funds on a statewide basis to equalize funds among rich and poor districts. The school financing reform
was defeated two to one, and, according to Professor Bachrach, voters from the poorer
districts also voted against the equalization measure. Id. at 61.
74. Ledbetter, supra note 1, at 22.
75. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
76. Ralph Nader approves the growing number of citizen groups, usually operating
with little money, who are organizing referenda on consumer, tax, environmental,
spending, energy and government disclosure subjects. He reports that the defeat of
many consumer and environmental referenda is usually caused by major television
campaigns which distort the issue and raise the false spectre of massive unemployment.
He accused the atomic power industry and its allies of using such scare tactics promoted
at a cost of millions of dollars. Nader, Direct Democracy via Referenda, Washington
Star, Nov. 6, 1976, § C, at 1, col. 1.
77. See generally Note, The California Initiative Process: A Suggestion for Reform, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 922 (1975).
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campaigns. The security of minority rights and the value of racial
equality which those rights affirm are endangered by the possibility of
78
popular repeal.
The damage could be far-reaching indeed if Senator Abourezk's
resolution for a national referendum becomes law.7 9 The safeguards
in the proposed referendum process are wholly inadequate to protect
78. We have been considering the use of the referendum to bar low-income housing,
but a state's affirmative action policies in public colleges and professional schools could
easily become the subject of an initiative as well. In such a case it is unlikely that the
public's action would accord with the legal approval voiced by the Washington Supreme
Court in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wn. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973). How many California voters would support Justice Powell's compromise of the issues involved in the
Bakke case? Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S.Ct. 2733 (1978). Would the result be different if affirmative action programs had to win approval in a national referendum?
79. S.J. Res. 67, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The text of the proposed amendment
provides:
S.J. REs. 67 . . . Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of A merica in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part
of the Constitution if ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several
States:
"ARTICLE...

"SECTION 1. The people of the United States shall have the power to propose and
enact laws in accordance with this article, except with respect to carrying out the
powers granted to Congress in clauses 11 and 15 of article I, section 8 of this Constitution. This article does not grant the people of the United States the power to
propose amendments to this Constitution.
"SEc. 2. A law is proposed by presenting to the chief law enforcement officer of
the United States a petition that sets forth the text of the proposed law and contains
signatures, collected within the eighteen months prior to such presentation, of registered voters equal in number to three per centum of the ballots cast in the last
general election for President and which includes the signatures of registered voters in each of ten States equal in number to three per centum of the ballots cast in
the last general election for President in each of the ten States. Within ninety days
of such presentation, the chief law enforcement officer of the United States shall determine the validity of the signatures contained in such petition through consultation with the appropriate States. Upon a determination that such petition contains
the required number of valid signatures, he shall certify such petition. He shall then
direct that the proposed law be placed on the ballot at the next general election held
for choosing Members of the House of Representatives occurring at least one
hundred and twenty days after such certification. The Congress shall provide by
law reasonable procedures for the preparation and transmittal of such petitions,
and for the certification of signatures on such petitions. For the purposes of this
section, the term 'State' shall include the District of Columbia.
"SEc. 3. A proposed law shall be enacted upon approval by a majority of the
people casting votes with respect to such proposed law and shall take effect thirty
days after such approval except as otherwise provided in the proposed law. Any
law enacted pursuant to this article shall be a law the same as any other law of the
United States, except that any law to repeal or amend a law enacted pursuant to
this article during the two years immediately following its effective date must receive an affirmative roll-call vote of two-thirds of the members of each House duly
elected and sworn. No law, the enactment of which is forbidden the Congress by
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minority rights. The signatures of only three percent of the voters in
80
the last general election are enough to place a measure on the ballot.
Although no constitutional amendment may be enacted by the people,8 1 nor any law forbidden by the Constitution, 82 there is no barrier to an initiative designed to repeal all or portions of federal civil
rights laws. 8 3 Congressional repeal of an anti-civil rights initiative
would be possible, but, during the first two years after its enactment,
such repeal would require a two-thirds vote of Congress. 84 During any
such effort to repeal an initiative, certainty and predictability in the
law would suffer. Even if the initiative proposal is rejected by the voters, a well-financed petition campaign itself might convey a most unfortunate message to blacks, the nation, and the world regarding the
distance we have traveled toward racial equality since the Supreme
Court rejected the hypocritical "separate but equal" standard of
85
Plessy v. Ferguson.
IV.

REMEDIES FOR IRRESPONSIBLE REFERENDA

Blacks and other minorities neither seek nor need absolute protection against the dangers they face from direct democracy. There will
this Constitution or any amendment thereof may be enacted by the people under
this article.
"SEC. 4. The Congress and the people shall have the power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation."
Id. (emphasis in original).
80. Id. § 2.
81.
Id. § 1.
82. Id. § 3.
83. The concern is not hypothetical. During the Senate hearings on Resolution 67,
Professor Peter G. Fish suggested that the initiative might be used in some areas to repeal civil rights acts. Hearings,supra note 73, at 113-16. In an editorial supporting the
national referendum proposal, the Lynchburg, Va. News saw no danger of majoritarian
tyranny in a government founded on the principle of majority rule. The News thought
that the concern for majoritarian tyranny expressed by opponents of the proposal (including Professor Fish) sprang from other sources:
The opponents of a national referendum see a great danger to some of their pet
ideas-mandatory school busing, quotas for school assignment, hiring, firing, promotions, gun controls, et cetera-all issues which the national polls show the people oppose by strong majorities. Hence, their alarm at rule by the majority.
Lynchburg, Va. News, Jan. 2, 1978, reprinted in Hearings,supra note 73, at 121.
84. S.J. Res. 67, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1977).
85. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), rejected, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In
his testimony, Professor Fish agreed with a suggestion that Resolution 67 might prove a
stimulant to societal conflict, stating, "I should think that if a proposal to repeal the
Civil Rights Act of 1968 [42 U.S.C. 88 3601-3619 (1968)] or even a petition campaign
launched to do so, that would certainly not be conducive to a harmonious society."
Hearings,.supra note 73, at 116.
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therefore be no call here for a ban on referenda and initiatives. Nevertheless, these popular sovereignty processes do present a threat to minority rights.
The threat persists largely because the Supreme Court, for the most
part, refuses to alter or strike down laws which, although neutral in
form, function to promote racial discrimination. The courts should at
least recognize that the initiative and referendum may operate as a
nonracial fagade covering distinctly discriminatory measures. Moreover, lower-class whites will often support referenda advancing middle-class values, to the detriment of their own economic interests, in
order to secure their racial status. 86 Thus, referenda and initiatives expose blacks to harm not only because referenda serve to enact racially
hostile measures, but also because blacks are isolated from their class
allies and thus have diminished electoral strength.
Although the racial motivation is hidden, its effects are not; and the
damage to minorities and to the integrity of a representative government can be as severe as that of the overtly racist laws existing in this
country before 1954.87 The evidence, both historical and contemporary, justifies a heightened scrutiny of ballot legislation similar to that
recognized as appropriate when the normal legislative process carries
potential harm to the rights of minority individuals. This protection
should be provided as a logical development of existing Supreme
Court doctrine.
The referendum, while entitled to judicial respect, is not wholly beyond constitutional scrutiny. In Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly 88 the Court invalidated a reapportionment scheme apportioning
one legislative chamber on a basis other than the population standard
set forth in Reynolds v. Sims. 89 The fact that the scheme had been
adopted by referendum did not insulate it from fourteenth amend86.

For example, as we saw earlier, a referendum intended to protect the single

family home status of a residential community by barring low-income housing will receive support from lower-class whites, although they thereby vote against their own opportunity to live in the lower-income apartments which would otherwise be built.
87. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Obviously public housing
and urban renewal programs have great physical and social impact upon urban areas.
This impact is sufficient to justify public scrutiny. It is urged, however, that this responsibility be placed on elected representatives rather than on plebiscites because of the
danger of overt or covert exclusion of the poor and minorities from white, middle-class

neighborhoods.
88.

377 U.S. 713 (1964).

89.

377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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ment examination. 9 0 Unfortunately, the racial motivations and discriminatory impact of many modern referenda and initiatives cannot
similarly be attacked directly because the measures are couched in racially neutral terms and may be viewed as serving some legitimate,
nonracial public purpose. The current Court has refused to invalidate
laws as invidiously discriminatory merely because they have discriminatory impact; the Court insists that a discriminatory purpose must be
shown. Blacks and other minorities will encounter substantial difficulty when they challenge a referendum on race discrimination
grounds because, as in Valtierra, they must show "that a law
seem9 '1
ingly neutral on its face is in fact aimed at a racial minority. "
However, the racially discriminatory impact of ballot legislation is
not the only constitutional problem presented. The initiative and referendum are participatory political processes; they involve voting.
Therefore, the cases protecting the right to vote and the equal power
of every person's vote can be brought to bear, and the reasoning of
those cases applied. Although the Court's dominant concern in the
"one person, one vote" cases was to prevent the dilution of the individual citizen's vote, the Court was also concerned with the proper
functioning of the republican form of government by insuring equally
weighted votes. This concern for republicanism was articulated by
Chief Justice Warren in Reynolds v. Sims: "The right to vote freely
for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of represen92
tative government."
This theme of protection of the republican system of governmentand impliedly the protection of the society vouchsafed by that republican system-was announced more clearly in the cases involving atlarge elections in multi-member districts. The Warren Court often expressed concern that at-large election schemes had long been used as
a means of diluting the votes of minority groups or political parties.
On more than one occasion, the Court warned that such legislative or
90. "An individual's constitutionally protected right to cast an equally weighted
vote cannot be denied even by a vote of a majority of the state's electorate, if the apportionment scheme adopted by the voters fails to measure up to the requirements of the
Equal Protection Clause." Lucas, 377 U.S. at 736.
91. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. at 14 1. Such a showing might, in some cases, be attempted by using evidence of public opinion polls of the reasons that people voted, the
advertising campaign in support of the referendum, or even statements by the supporters of the referendum.
92. 377 U.S. at 555.

The Referendum
local districts would be found unconstitutional where they were
shown to operate "designedly or otherwise . . . under the circumstances of a particular case [to] minimize or cancel out the voting
93
strength of racial or political elements of the voting population.
Referenda and initiatives are "at-large elections" on issues instead
of candidates. Just as multi-member districts have the potential of
minimizing or cancelling out the voting strength of racial or political
groups in the election of officials, referenda and initiatives have a similar effect on direct legislation. In both cases the strength of the minority will be diluted.
The same danger to the republican process which was present in
the multi-district cases is present here. The danger is twofold. First, in
a particular referendum on a particular issue, a matter extremely
harmful to minority interests but only moderately beneficial to nonminority interests may be passed; the ballot does not easily register intensity of interest as the legislative process does. Second, the initiative
and referendum processes in general prevent meaningful participation
by minority groups. As more legislation is passed through direct ballot, minorities are increasingly excluded from participating in
decisions affecting the entire society. 94 Of what value is it to protect
93. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965). See also White v. Regester, 412
U.S. 755 (1973); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 751-54 (1973); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966). Cf. United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144,
165-68 (1977) (opinion of White, Stevens, and Rehnquist, JJ.) (fact that there was no
general fencing out of white population from participation in the political process of the
county and that white voting strength generally was not minimized or cancelled out as
reason permitting deliberate increase in nonwhite voting strength in particular districts).
The Fortson formulation is, perhaps, too strong for current trends. In Whitcomb v.
Davis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971), the Court declared that the mere lack of legislative representation by blacks proportionate to black voting population was not enough to show an
unconstitutional dilution of voting strength by adoption of at-large districts. The blacks
charging dilution must also show that the dilution was the result of intentional discrimination. In Whitcomb, a black area within a multi-member district had had fewer representatives than its proportion of the population. But, as the Court emphasized, this was
more the result of the balance of Republican against Democratic power in the district
rather than a scheme to exclude blacks. Indeed, for the Democrats to win in the district,
they needed black support and campaigned strongly in the ghetto. Id. at 149-53.
Not surprisingly, outside the South, with its long history of official discrimination,
few litigants have succeeded in meeting these standards of intent or motive which Justice Douglas rightly called "asking the impossible." Id. at 180. Accordingly, the argument of preserving the representative system of government may well be a stronger one
for these voting cases.
94. Such representational subordination might also be defined as electoral action
by the majority which decreases the opportunity of a minority group and its members to
participate in the political, social, and economic mainstream of society (as do similarly
situated members of the majority). A hard and inflexible formula for finding representational subordination would be difficult to construct and might be unwieldy in applica-
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an individual's right to vote for elected officials if the important decisions are made in referenda rather than in the legislature?
Thus, there is reason to scrutinize measures passed by initiative or
referendum. In doing so the Court would be protecting participation
in the political process and the integrity of the representational system, rather than directly remedying racial discrimination, with the belief that as long as the representational system is sound and minorities
are effectively participating in the decisionmaking process, minorities
can safeguard their own interests. 95 Although in one sense any referendum or initiative operates counter to the representative system, the
need for court protection of that system is strongest when the majority
attempts through the direct ballot to take away something the
minority obtained through the representative system. As a first step,
Court scrutiny of ballot legislation might arguably be limited to such
cases.
The theme that the Court protects access to the vote as a part of its
protection of the representative process has been repeated in voting
rights cases other than the "one person, one vote" and multi-member
district cases. In 1969 the Court refused to permit a North Carolina
county to reinstate its literacy tests for voter registration because the
failure to provide black residents with "equal educational opportuni96
ties ... deprived them of an equal chance to pass the literacy test."
The Court was concerned about the potential effect of unequal educational opportunities on the exercise of the franchise. 97 This concern
manifested itself in relief for blacks who were exempted from the literacy test requirement, even though there was no proof of intentional
wrongful action by either school or voting officials. Thus, in an action
tion. Rather, courts could review each case on its facts, considering (1)the history of
overt or institutional discrimination to which the minority group has been subjected; (2)
the degree to which the minority group continues to suffer from discrimination; (3)
whether the referendum action increases the difficulty minorities will experience in
overcoming past and/or present discrimination; and (4) whether the neutral goals sought
to be achieved by the referendum could have been achieved through policies less harmful
to minority interests.
95. Such protection of the representative system must have been the Court's aim in
Lucas when it ordered a reapportionment remedy contrary to that the majority of voters
had selected for themselves. 377 U.S. 713 (1964). See notes 88-90 and accompanying
text supra.

96. Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 291 (1969).
97. See id. at 293-96. Despite the fact that official voting discrimination had ceased
and significant strides had been made toward equalizing and integrating the public
schools, the Court declared that " '[i]
mpartial' administration of the literacy test today
would serve only to perpetuate these inequities in a different form." Id. at 297.

The Referendum
brought under the 1965 Voting Rights Act,98 the Court prevented
what otherwise would have been a severe dilution of black voting
strength with a concomitant weakening of the representative character essential to a republican form of government. 99
Similarly, the Court has often expressed concern that the election
process not be burdened by unnecessarily rigorous residence and registration requirements, 10 0 that elections not be unreasonably limited

98. Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 4, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1976).
99. Also relevant to this discussion is the republican form of government guarantee
in the Constitution:
The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form
of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. For a summary of the history of this provision, from its origins
as a response to the Constitutional Convention's great fear of direct democracy and its
members' preference for a republican or representative government to its present moribund status, see Seeley, The Public Referendum and Minority Group Legislation:
Postscript to Reitman v. Mulkey, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 881, 905-10 (1970). In brief,
while intended to insure governments in which majority authority would be tempered
by representative considerations, the guarantee was early cited to the Court by conflicting political factions, each claiming to represent the majority. The Supreme Court determined that either the Congress or the President had the authority under the provision
and should decide such political issues. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162
(1874); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
The Court did define a republican form of government, in terms similar to those used
by Madison, supra note 59, in Duncan v. McCall, 139 U.S. 449, 461 (1891). But later
the Court reiterated its earlier position that such claims were nonjusticiable political
questions. Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (claim that state
has ceased to be republican in form because of adoption of the initiative and referendum is a political, not judicial, question which is for Congress to determine). Much
later, both Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and Reyniolds made clear that the nonjusticiable conclusion represented only a discretionary decision not to hear "republican
form" issues. As Professor Seeley points out, supra at 909, it would not have been easy
to use a still nebulous standard to test the representativeness of the malapportioned
legislatures under attack in those cases. But it is far easier, and more appropriate to the
history of the republican guarantee clause, to use it in its absolute rather than in a comparative sense. While the republican guarantee clause is sufficiently elastic to enable occasional instances of "direct" as opposed to "representative" government, see Note,
Constitutionality of the Referendum, 41 YALE L. J. 132, 133 (193 1), Professor Seeley
makes a point that deserves far more attention than it has received when he concludes as
follows:
A system that subjects pro-minority group legislation already passed by representative government to approval by absolute majority vote is similarly an obvious
denial of a republican form of government. It is not representative at all, and it
subjects the minority to exactly the kind of capriciousness that the guarantee clause
was intended to prevent. Thus, the discrimination-prone referendum should not be
liable to political question objections for lack of an applicable standard.
Seeley, supra at 909 (footnotes omitted).
100. Compare Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973), Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330 (1972), & Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) with Rosario v. Rockefeller,
410 U.S. 752 (1973) & Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973).
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only to those voters deemed primarily interested,1 0 1 and that no barrier of wealth limit access to either the ballot box' 02 or a place on the
ballot.' 03 These holdings, particularly those striking down wealth barriers, survive even though a majority of the current Court has refused
to measure differential impacts based on economic status by the strict
scrutiny standard applicable to classifications based on race.1 04 Protection of voting rights and the political process is evidently a
preferred value.
Surely, within the parameters of decisions committed to protecting
the integrity of the electoral system, so frequently designated as the
heart of our representative government, there is doctrinal space to
prevent an electoral majority from subverting the gains made by minorities through participation in representative government. These
precedents provide the means to prevent the majority from abusing its
power to uproot those protections against discrimination without
which minority group members are as effectively prevented from
meaningful participation in the electoral process as they earlier were
by poll taxes and literacy tests.
V.

CONCLUSION

Justice Black's declaration that referenda demonstrate devotion to
democracy rather than to bias, discrimination, or prejudice, is in fact
almost the opposite of the truth when the issue submitted to the voters
suggests, even subtly, that majority interests can be furthered by the
sacrifice of minority rights. The failure to recognize the special dangers to minority groups in the referendum process can be attributed to
a reluctance to acknowledge either that there are minorities in society
or that there is racism. Of course, both exist, and neither is likely to
disappear in the near future. For ours is a heterogeneous society.
There is ample reason today to give serious consideration to the
101. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969). See also City
of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S.
701 (1969). But see Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S.
719 (1973).
102. See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
103. See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134
(1973). Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (campaign contributions and expenditures).
104. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).

The Referendum
founding fathers' cautious approach to direct democracy. They were
closer than we to those basic structural arrangements by which individual rights in a free society must be protected against the tyranny of
the majority. Slavery has had permanent impact on American life.
Among its effects are racial antagonism and a false sense of racial superiority for the great mass of whites which, if not curable, should at
least be contained by a judicial preference for the representative mode
of government, where its worst tendencies toward prejudice will be
chastened in legislative debate and public scrutiny and diluted by political compromise.

